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became righteously indignant at what he was bound to regard as Northern aggression and infractions of the constitution."

The description of the position of the planter class is well done and shows a sympathetic appreciation of their view of political questions. We have left ourselves little space to speak of the first three lectures. That on Washington is extremely eulogistic, that on Jefferson discriminating, that on Randolph most entertaining. Trent's choice of epithets for his protagonists is most happy. So are his comparisons of Washington in politics to Sophocles in literature and of Jefferson to Shelley. Sometimes, however, he makes comparisons which are rather fantastic than just, as when he speaks of Randolph as a compound of Ithuriel and Caliban. Indeed, an excessive desire to be vivid and striking seems the chief defect in the style of the lectures. Impartiality seems characteristic of Trent's view of every man but Alexander Hamilton. For some reason, he is unjust to him. The following sentence is so malignant and untrue as to be ridiculous: "He was selfish and cold, even when the man who had made him what he was lay dead at Mt. Vernon." Even Jefferson knew the chief author of the *Federalist* too well to speak of him in his bitterest moods, as "made" by Washington. The portraits of the men, who are the subjects of the lectures, add much to the value and attractiveness of the book.

The only serious misprint I have found is that John Taylor of Caroline County, Virginia, is always referred to as John Taylor of Carolina. Did the proof-reader refer to Johnson's "Cyclopædia," which, singularly, seems to have omitted the former man?

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An Examination of the Nature of the State. A Study in Political Philosophy. By WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, Ph. D. Pp. 448. Price, \$3.00. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1896.

It is a matter of primary importance to the advance of scientific thought that the views of conflicting schools be clearly and definitely presented. The endeavor to reconcile essentially conflicting views, has often been more of a barrier than an aid to progress. The work of Professor Willoughby may be regarded as a treatise on political science from the juristic standpoint. Although he is continually making reference to the psychic factors underlying political association, yet his conclusions are scarcely influenced by such factors. In fact, the general tenor of the work is more in harmony with Austin than any of the recent treatises on political science; and this, in spite of the fact that the author disagrees with Austin

on many important questions. The intellectual kinship is most strikingly shown in the method of reasoning. While endeavoring to give due weight to the principles of the historical school, the author's method is essentially analytical. His attitude toward the subject is best illustrated in the discussion of the factors of which political science must take account. Only those relations, whether individual or groupal, which are definitely formulated in law; only those activities which find expression through some legally organized channel, deserve to be recognized by political science as such. We have here a question of method which will probably give rise to much discussion. The statement that "as publicists or jurists we need not look back of the persons or bodies who have the legal power of expressing the will of the state," is one which may mean much or little, according to the influence the acceptance of such a view will exercise on our treatment of political phenomena. It may be an excellent principle when we are describing the operation of political institutions at any one period, without reference to the ideas upon which they rest or the functions which they have to perform. But we must recognize the fact that such a discussion gives us but one view of the phenomena; a view which is by no means the most important nor the most fruitful. Unless the limitations of this method are distinctly perceived, there is a constant danger of a confusion of thought resulting from a confusion in the use of terms. This is particularly true in the study of political development. The method adopted by Professor Willoughby does not lend itself to this branch of the science. Here we can advance only through a careful analysis of the relation between ideas, institutions, and the conditions of the objective and subjective environment. The very fact that the concepts of one period which have crystallized into a definite terminology, acquire a different content at a later period of development, ought to be conclusive on this point. An instance of the confusion to which a neglect of this elementary fact leads, is found in Chapter III, on the "Origin of the State." In endeavoring to draw a distinction between the family and the state, the author says:* "The two institutions are different in essence. In the family the location of authority is natural *i. e.* in the father. In the state it is one of choice. Subordination is the principle of the family; equality that of the state." Surely, the author has some particular period here in mind. His acquaintance with Maine, whom he often cites, is sufficient guarantee that he is aware that in primitive societies no such distinctions can be drawn, and that the term "family" itself means to-day an entirely different

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social grouping from that of the Roman family. Is the whole work intended to apply exclusively to the fully developed modern state, based upon the active national political consciousness? But, we read on page 27 that "we cannot refuse the designation of state to a society of men, if politically organized, even though it be in the nomadic stage. Low order of development cannot deprive an institution of its generic name." We have here convincing proof that the moment we get beyond the most general concepts, every political philosophy must be based upon the political and economic conditions peculiar to each stage of development; that our notion of law, of government, of sovereignty, of the nature of the state itself, must proceed from the analysis of existing political conditions. If the question of scope and method is to determine the nature of the conclusions of political science, or, if it is to set the limits to the phenomena of which the science will take cognizance, its satisfactory solution becomes a question vital to the future of the science. Through an unduly narrow view of the scope of the science, the value of several chapters of the work has been seriously impaired. This is particularly true of Chapters IX and XI on the "Power of the State: Sovereignty," and the "Location of Sovereignty in the Body Politic."

Throughout his book the author displays a thorough grasp of the literature of the subject. In his discussion and criticism of the social contract theory, we have probably the best statement of the defects of the theory viewed as an historical interpretation of the origin of the state. The chapter on the "Aims of the State" gives an excellent summary of the conditions which justify governmental interference. We are here far beyond the narrow and carping criticism of Spencer's "Man *vs.* The State." The question is viewed from the broad basis of social structure.

L. S. ROWE.